Ukrainian Sailors and Political Circus
Last November, three Ukrainian ships were arrested by the Russian Federation in the Kerch Strait, following a series of bizarre actions. Russia alleges an illegal crossing of state borders, for which criminal proceedings have been opened against 24 sailors. However, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ordered Russia to release the Ukrainian sailors, in Order of 25 May 2019 [
ITLoS]:
118. Having examined the measures requested by Ukraine, the Tribunal considers it appropriate under the circumstances of the present case to prescribe provisional measures requiring the Russian Federation to release the three Ukrainian naval vessels and the 24 detained Ukrainian servicemen and to allow them to return to Ukraine in order to preserve the rights claimed by Ukraine.
119. The Tribunal does not consider it necessary to require the Russian Federation to suspend criminal proceedings against the 24 detained Ukrainian servicemen and refrain from initiating new proceedings.
On 25 June, the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs communicated the following to its Ukrainian counterpart and ITLoS [
AntiKor] [
UkrInform]:
...
Criminal proceedings are continuing in the Russian Federation against 24 detainees of Ukrainian soldiers in connection with violations of Russian legislation on November 25, 2018, the legality and validity of which are not disputed by the decision of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea of May 25, 2019.
Considering the above, the Ukrainian side is invited to provide, in accordance with the criminal procedural legislation of the Russian Federation, written guarantees for the participation of each of the 24 Ukrainian sailors after their release from custody in the preliminary and judicial investigation, as well as written guarantees for the preservation of physical evidence — the Berdyansk naval ships Berdyansk, Nikopol, and Yany Kapu, after their transfer to the Party before a judicial judgment is rendered.
Nothing in this note can be interpreted as detrimental to the position of the Russian Federation on issues affecting its rights and obligations under international law, including the unlawful nature of the actions of Ukrainian ships in the Kerch Strait area on November 24-25, 2018, as well as non-applicability to this situation of the dispute settlement procedures provided for by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, in particular, by virtue of statements made by the Russian Federation and Ukraine when signing and ratifying the Convention.
...
Basically: they'll be released to Ukraine if Ukraine promises cooperation with a trial. Though considering their participation does not seem to require their physical presence in Russia (since that is rather trivial to arrange), Russia would have no means to enforce any judgment without cooperation of Ukrainian authorities anyway. I think it's pretty clear that Russia is more interested in a criminal judgment itself much more than a physical imprisonment of the sailors.
Foreign Minister Klimkin interpretation of this is as follows [
FB] [
UkrInform]:
... Russia does not conceal that it does not want to comply with the decisions of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Instead, she: a) requires us to acknowledge that our seamen could commit a crime, b) incline us to the recognition of the legality of the trial on them under Russian law, c) invites you to bend before the Criminal Procedure Code of the RF, and at the same time indirectly recognize the occupation Crimea.
Hmm... I thought Ukraine and Russia already had a treaty to recognise each others' criminal courts (though maybe Ukraine repudiated it and I don't remember). I'm not sure where the last part especially comes from, since IIRC some the territorial waters were on the Kuban side, i.e. before 2014, and in any case Ukraine would not be shy about about telling Russia to go to hell if a hypothetical future ruling hinges entirely on Crimea's waters. Though frankly, I'd be surprised if Russia seriously counting on Ukraine keeping any written consent to these conditions—the mere existence of written consent is probably more important.
Alright, so Klimkin interprets this as some sort of trap, but the circus starts with the fact the Klimkin made such a decision unilaterally, and not only did not consult the president, who has a constitutional responsibility for international relations, but did not even inform him of it [
Liga] [
UkrainaRu]. Some quotes from President Zelensky:
"I remind everyone, especially Mr Klimkin, that I am the President of Ukraine. I never saw our answer to the note of the Russian Federation. Mr Klimkin does not consider is necessary to discuss such issues with the President of Ukraine. This is a question of the security of the country, the life of our citizens. Something that is the priority of any president, whether someone likes him or not. As my assisants, diplomats, explained to me, such actions could jeopardise the return of our sailors."
Although Klimkin insisted that he acted within his competence, Zelensky had this to say:
"Yesterday was the last day when our sailors were to return us. We have everything—the right is there, the ruling is there, but there are no sailors. I am ready and willing to cling to anything to bring those guys home. I propose that the Foreign Ministry send a note to the parents of the sailors. I think it will be very interesting for them to read in terms of rights, laws, and virtuoso diplomacy."
This is not an outlier. The Rada and people connected with the previous administration have kind of informal war with the new president. Despite Zelensky's insistence that the Rada dismiss or punish Klimkin (more than once feuding with Klimkin, even), PM Groysman suggested that Zelensky ask Klimkin to go on a few-months vacation instead [
Liga]... following which Klimkin went on vacation on his own initiative.
Russia's side reacted with something like 'are you sure? you can rewrite your response if you want', according to Grigori Karasin, Deputy Head of Ministry of Foreign Affairs [
RIA]:
"A negative response was received instantly. If the Ukrainian side considers it necessary to change its attitude to this proposal, it is free to do so."
It looks like Zelensky may want to make use of this opportunity.
Meanwhile, there is some possibility of indicting ex-president Poroshenko on treason charges [
DBR]:
On 21 May 2019, investigators of the Central Office of the State Bureau of Investigations, at the request of Portnov AV, entered into the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations information on the possible commission by officials who occupy a particularly responsible position in the organs of state power of Ukraine, criminal offenses under Art. 109 CCU (actions aimed at violent change or overthrow of the constitutional order or the seizure of state power), art. 111 KKU (state betrayal) and 426-1 KKU (exceeding the military official's authority or official authority).
These are the events of 25 Nov 2018, related to the transition of the ship's navy group from the Black Sea to the Azov Sea in the Kerch Strait. Pre-trial investigation has begun.
I wouldn't count on this actually sticking Poroshenko with anything, though it's just one of at least six criminal proceedings against Poroshenko, and it's not without some basis because the events in the Kerch Strait don't make much sense unless one assumes that someone wanted the ships to be fired upon from the start. But while Poroshenko is a big enough fish, I wonder who will protect Klimkin when the Rada is replaced soon.
...
Some vaguely similar but better news, though: On 27 Jun, there was meeting between leaders of separatist republics (Pushilin of DNR and Pasechnik of LNR) and Medvechuk, one of the leaders Ukrainian opposition party
For Life, in which the return of four Ukrainian prisoners were successfully negotiated as a good-will gesture to Ukraine [
UkrainaRu]. But more of a silver lining on an overall cloud of worsening situation there.
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